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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------00000---------_0

1•,.i.-r·JJIF PROCTOR,

on behalf of

t,..,, m1nnr daughter, ANGELA
PR<lCTOR,

Plaintiff/Appellant,
v,

Civil No. 19288

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER
aka SHIRLEY PROCTOR,
Defendants/Respondents.

----------00000---------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an Order granting Summary Judgment in
favor of Respondents dismissing Appellant's Complaint against
Respondent Shirley Proctor, the recipient of certain life
insurance proceeds, and Respondent Insurance Company of North
America, the payor of those insurance proceeds.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a Complaint in District Court for Salt Lake
County seeking recovery of $48,601.50 in life insurance proceeds
1·1hi ch

Respondent Insurance Company of North America had paid to

Respondent Shirley Proctor under an accidental death policy on
':he life of one Willis B. Proctor.

Respondents answered.

lnterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents were
·xchanged and the deposition of Respondent Shirley Proctor was

taken.

The parties agreed that the matter could be decided by

the Trial Court on Stipulated Facts.

Motions for Summary

Judgment, supporting Memoranda, and the Stipulated Facts were
filed by all parties.

It was agreed that there were no other

operative or material facts in dispute.
argued to the Trial Court.

The matter was then

The Trial Court issued its Memorandum

Decision and granted Respondents' Motions for Summary Judgment
and denied Appellant's Motion.

Appellant now appeals the Trial

Court's Summary Judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Shirley Proctor seeks an affirmance of the Trial
Court's Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's Complaint and an
award of her costs incurred in connection with this Appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts is substantially correct,
however, certain additional facts contained in the Stipulated
Facts filed with the Trial Court have been omitted.

Respondent

will set forth those additional facts so that this Court can be
apprised of all the facts the Trial Court relied on in granting
Summary Judgment.

The actual Stipulated Facts, as filed with the

Trial Court, has been included in the Appendix to this Brief and
labelled Exhibit "1".

Additionally, Appellant's reference to the

Mexican records search, while not at all relevant to the issues
of this Appeal, necessitates a response.
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First, with regard to the two policies of life insurance
rPferred to in Appellant's Statement of Facts, the Decedent
1v111
1 ;_

is B. Proctor, when purchasing the first policy, affixed to

a stamp electing for Plan II, entitled "Member and Spouse".

(R-313).

When Mr. Proctor purchased the second policy of

insurance, he again checked a box on the application entitled
"Member and Spouse".
on both applications.

(R-313).

Mr. Proctor's signature appears

(R-313,314).

Respondent Shirley Proctor participated in a marriage
ceremony with Willis B. Proctor in Las Vegas, Nevada, on July 15,
1967.

(R-315)

A copy of the marriage certificate reflecting

such ceremony is attached to the Stipulated Facts, as Exhibit 4.
(R-320).

Willis Proctor resided in Utah from 1967 until his

death on September 29, 1980.

(R-315) . . Respondent Shirley

Proctor also resided with Mr. Proctor from 1967 on and, in fact,
both the decedent and Respondent resided together in the home of
Mr. Proctor's parents continuously for four to five years before
his death.

(R-315).

In addition, the decedent and Respondent

filed joint income tax returns, as husband and wife, for the
years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978, and 1979.

(R-315)

Mr.

Proctor filed a separate income tax return for the year 1976, and
copies of all returns were attached to the Stipulated Facts and
marked collectively as Exhibit 5.

(R-320-333).

During the period of time the decedent and Respondent
iesided together, the decedent signed various documents
indicating Respondent to be his wife.
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Attached to the Stipulated

Facts was a loan application from Consolidated Freightways Credit
Union (R-334), designating the decedent as being married and
bearing his signature, and an anniversary card from the decedent
(R-187) which he sent to Respondent in July of 1980,
approximately two months before his death.

It was admitted by

all parties that the signatures contained on all of the Exhibits
attached to the Stipulated Facts were the signatures of the
decedent Willis B. Proctor.

(R-316)

Turning now to Appellant's statements related to the Mexican
records search, it should be first noted that the deposition
referred to was published at the hearing of the Motions for
Summary Judgment and the same statements as found on pages 3, 4,
and 5 of Appellant's Brief were made to the Trial Court prior to
its granting Summary Judgment.

The Trial Court considered that

deposition in making its decision.

(R-382)

Appellant failed to

mention the fact that Respondent was initially represented by a
member of the Bar who was, at the time, experiencing serious
psychological as well as various other problems.

(R-132) .

It

was that counsel who filed the original Answer in this matter and
failed to appear at a hearing and consequently allowed a Judgment
to be entered against Respondent.

(R-111)

At that time,

Respondent's present counsel appeared, secured a withdrawal from
Respondent's counsel through D. Frank Wilkins, the lawyer
appointed by the Utah State Bar to assist Respondent's previous
counsel (R-125) and obtained an Order setting aside the Judgment.
(R-145) An Amended Answer (R-157) was then filed establishing the

4

issues that were resolved by the Trial Court in the summary
Judgment proceeding.
The Trial Court issued a Memorandum Decision and a copy of
H1at, together with a copy of the Court's Summary Judgment, have
been included in the Appendix to this Brief and are labelled
Exhibits "2" and "3", respectively.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INSURANCE POLICIES IN QUESTION WERE CONTRACTS BETWEEN
THE INSURED (WILLIS B. PROCTOR) AND THE INSURER (I.N.A.)
AND AS SUCH, EFFECT IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE INSURED'S
INTENTIONS THAT RESPONDENT TAKE AS HIS BENEFICIARY

A.
GIVEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACTS, THE TRIAL
COURT WAS COMPELLED TO CONSIDER EACH OF THE
STIPULATED FACTS IN ORDER TC DETERMINE
THE INTENT OF THE DECEDENT
In addressing Point I of Appellant's Brief, Respondent
admits that she was not the "legal" wife of Willis Proctor
because his divorce from his former wife had yet to become final
when he married Respondent.

Respondent does not admit, however,

that she cannot be considered the spouse of Mr. Proctor for
certain limited purposes, including receipt of the insurance
proceeds in question.

As was recognized and stated by the Trial

Court in its Memorandum Decision:

. The facts clearly demonstrate that the defendant
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was not the legal wife of the
deceased Willis B. Proctor.
This Court is of the
opinion, however, that whether or not the defendant
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was the legal wife or merely
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held out to be the wife of the deceased Willis B
Proctor is not the principle issue for this Court t;
decide, but rather the issue is whether or not it was
the intent of Willis B. Proctor that Shirley Worthen
(Proctor) would be the beneficiary under the policies
before the Court.
(R-378)
It is the intent of the decedent that had to be determined in
order to protect the integrity of the contract and to assure that
the result ultimately intended was ultimately obtained.
Appellant's entire argument revolves around her claim that
since Respondent was not the "legal" wife of the decedent, she
is, therefore, not entitled to any benefits of the thirteen year
relationship which both Respondent and decedent believed to be
legally proper.

(R-177)

The argument chooses to ignore the

basic contract principles related to insurance policies that, if
at all possible, the intent of the insured should be determined
and carried out.

Appellant suggested to both the Trial Court and

this Court that the

for insurance were clear on their

faces and consequently there is no need to determine the
insured's intent.
clear.

To the contrary, those policies were not

Neither policy specifically defined "spouse" and more

importantly the decedent himself physically affixed a stamp and
checked a box on the policies acknowledging his understanding
that he did indeed have a spouse at the time he entered into the
contracts for insurance.

Succinctly put, the acts of the

decedent, when contracting for the insurance, required the Trial
Court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine his true intent
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and carry out the same.
iJt.

As was stated in Mathis v. Madsen, 1

2r1 41i, 261 P. 2d 952 (1953),
That fact alone, however, does not relieve the Court
(nor this Court) of its responsibility to ascertain its
[the contract] meaning if that can be done under the
provisions of law respecting this type of instrument.
In searching for the meaning the Court must first
examine the language used in the instrument itself and
accord to it the weight and effect which the instrument
itself may show that the parties intended the words to
have.
If then its meaning is still ambiguous or
uncertain, the Court may consider other contemporaneous
writings concerning the same subject matter, and may,
if it is still uncertain, consider parole evidence of
the
parties'
intention.
(citations)
[bracketed
language added]
Id. at 956.
Under the standards of Mathis, supra, the Trial Court looked

at the contracts, correctly determined the need for interpretation to determine the true intent of the decedent and then
considered the stipulated facts agreed to by the parties so that
the true intent of the decedent could be .determined and followed.
This Court has always recognized the importance of
determining the parties' intent in insurance contract cases.

In

Bergera v. Ideal National Life Insurance Company, 524 P.2d 599
(Utah, 1974), it was noted that in the interpretation of
insurance policies,
The policy is merely a contract between the insured and
the insurer.
Its language should be construed pursuant
to the same rules as were applied to other ordinary
contracts, to-wit: What did the parties thereto intend
by the language used?
Id. at 600.
(Emphasis added.)
The rule in Bergera, supra, is in accord with numerous other
;u11sdictions.

The supreme Court of Illinois, in New York Life

Insurance Company v. Rak, 24 Ill.2d 128, 180 N.E.2d 470

(1962)

stated:
In contracts of life
the insurance company
of
insured
be is the intent to be

insurance where the insured and
are the contracting parties, the
as to who the beneficiary shall
determined.
Id. at 472.

Likewise, in Smith v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 142
F.Supp. 320 (D.D.C., 1956), the District Court gave effect to
manifest intention of the insured and stated "The importance of
one intention of the insured, and the weight to be given to that
intention, are continually emphasized in the authorities".
at 324.

Id.

See also Standard Life Insurance Company of the South v.

Franks, 260 So.2d 365 (La. App., 1973); Butcher v. Pollard, 32
Ohio App.2d 1, 288 N.E. 2d 204 (1972);
In this case the decedent and Respondent were always, in
their own minds, legally husband and wife.

(R-177)

When the

decedent, as member of the Chevron Travel Club, Inc., applied for
insurance, he chose not to sign up individually, but in
conjunction with his "spouse".

It was the decedent who put the

stamp designating "spouse" on the first application and checked
the box labelled "Member and Spouse" on the second application.
These actions alone lead to the presumption that that if the
decedent perceived Respondent as his spouse in application for
the policies, that he also perceived her as his spouse for the
beneficial aspects of the policy.

Likewise, it is logical to

conclude that if Respondent were to have predeceased Mr. Proctor,
he would have taken as her beneficiary under the policies.
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In addition, the actions taken by the decedent, prior to and
with the designation of Respondent as the
heneficiary under the policies, also clearly illustrate the
Jecedent's intent.

They married in 1967.

his parents home from 1975-1980.

(R-315)

(R-320)

They lived at

He signed various

documents indicating Respondent to be his wife.

For example,

both filed and signed joint income tax returns as husband and
wife for the years 1973, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979,
IR-321-333) and just two months before his death he sent
Respondent an anniversary card which stated "For my Wonderful
Wife on our Anniversary".

(R-335)

Taken together, decedent's actions unequivocally demonstrate
that he considered Respondent to be his spouse.

Although not

legally married, they held each other out to be husband and wife
and thereby satisfied the definition of "spouse" in the insurance
policy.

Indeed, the language of the policy itself did not

specifically require that the insured's wife be the legal wife of
the insured.

Decedent's designation, combined with his

consistent actions over a 13-year period, satisfied the
requirement of the policy to establish an intended beneficiary.
It would be an injustice, therefore, to negate the
decedent's clear intent only because his marriage is not
recognized by this State.
JPcdt with the issue,

Although Utah has not specifically

a number of jurisdictions have held that an

"'lawflll marital relationship existing between insured and the
bPneficiary of his life policy will not furnish a basis for

invalidating the insured's actual intent.

See, Moore v.

Traveler's Ins. Co., 74 Ohio App. 420, 59 N.E.2d 255
1944); National Life

&

(Ohio,

Accident Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 153 S.W.2d

332 (Tex. 1941); Strachan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 73 N.E.2d 840
(Mass., 1940); Hendricks v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 27
A.2d 261

(Pa., 1942); Winbush v. Lyons, 46 S.E.2d 138 (Ga.,

1948); Supreme Tent K.M. of the World v. McAllister, 92 N.W. 770
(Mich., 1902).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana dealt with a
case very similar to the one at hand.

In Jones v. Equitable Life

Assurance Society of U.S., 173 So.2d 373 (La.App., 1965), a
daughter of the insured's first marriage sued the insurer and
insured's second wife for proceeds paid under a group life
policy.

The Plaintiff's mother divorced her father in 1929 on

the grounds of adultery and alleged that the father's second wife
was a woman living in this open and notorious state.

The

Defendant (second wife) was herself married to a third party
until June of 1938.

Regardless of the two legal marriages

existing, the decedent and his second wife continuously lived
together from sometime prior to June 10, 1929, until the
decedent's death on October 7, 1957.

At the time of the death,

there was in effect a group life insurance policy covering the
life of the husband.

The policy did not name a specific

beneficiary, but used a preference beneficiary schedule exactly
like that used in the case at hand.

Plaintiff (daughter of first

wife) brought this action claiming that the second wife was not
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entitled to the proceeds due to the fact that the marriage was a
nullity under Louisiana law.

The Court, in holding that the

"e,,nnd wife was legally entitled to the proceeds, stated:
It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that
the Plaintiff has failed to prove that the Defendant
was in bad faith, that she had any knowledge of the
impediment to her marriage and that under the settled
jurisprudence of the State of Louisiana, she contracted
the marriage with the decedent in good faith and would
therefore, be a putative wife and as such entitled to
the civil effects of the marriage, that is in this case
the proceeds from the insurance policy which is the
subject of this suit.
Id. at 377.
There are also other reasons relied by Courts in deciding
cases dealing with beneficiary designation and payment of
proceeds.

In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Mattocks, 6 Ariz.

App. 450, 433 P. 2d 303 (1967), a case involving the
interpretation of certain words contained in a health and
accident insurance policy, the Court of Appeals of Arizona stated
the accepted principle that:
We are inclined to agree with the Louisiana Court
that provisions of the life, health and accident policy
should be given a liberal interpretation to the end
that equity be done and the underlying beneficient
purposes of a contract not be rendered nugatory.
Id.
at 306.
HPrP,

the job of the Trial Court was to determine and protect the

intent of the decedent.

It correctly completed this task.

The

documents and the decedent's overt acts, as well as those of
Respondent, clearly show what that intent was and the integrity
··f

those contracts should be protected.

11

B.
THE WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION CASES RELIED UPON
BY APPELLANT ARE INAPPLICABLE TO A PRIVATE
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTE
Appellant, in her attempt to put forth the position that
there is no legal recognition of plural marriages, continually
refers to a line of cases regarding the question of death
benefits under the Utah Workman's Compensation Act.

These cases

involve the question of whether or not a "common-law" wife of a
decedent can be allowed to recover statutory death benefits under
Utah law.

They are inapplicable to the questions of contract law

raised in this case.

The cases represented by Appellant's

citation of Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P.
1026 (1942), in no way addressed the issues of:
A.

Whether or not under contract principles, an

intended beneficiary will not be allowed to recover said
proceeds simply because the marriage between the insured and
the beneficiary was invalid;
B.

Whether or not Defendant in this case was

equitably entitled to the insurance proceeds on the basis o!
the Utah Annulment Statutes which vest in this Court the
discretion to divide and appropriate assets of a voided
marriage; and
C.

Whether or not Defendant is equitably entitled tc

receive the benefits of the policy in that her marriage to
the decedent should be considered valid for these purposes
only.
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The question before the Utah Supreme Court in each one of
the Industrial Commission cases relied upon by Appellant was,
>•lainly and simply, an interpretation of Utah statutory law
,f'qarding who is entitled to receive benefits under the Workman's
Compensation Act.
The Court in Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 284,
43 P.2d 696

(1935), emphasized that fact when, in deciding who

was to receive Workman's Compensation dependent benefits, it
stated:
The only question in this division of the case, is
as to whether Mrs. Schurler can be considered a member
of the decedent's family as that was meant by the
Compensation Act.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 698.
This language clearly shows that it is the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Utah that beneficiary questions in Workman's
Compensation cases are to be interpreted .from the statutory
language and not contract principles.

In dealing with the public

funds involved in the benefits of a workman's compensation claim
the legislature and the Courts are bound by a fiduciary duty to
be thrifty in protecting those public funds.

This is not the

case when we are dealing with a private insurance contract.

The

binding principle then, as stated in the Bergera case, supra, is
that the most important element is the intent of the parties
into the contract.

Respondent, through documentation

example, demonstrated the clear intent of decedent -- that he
-rn1sidered Respondent his spouse and the beneficiary of his life
insurance proceeds.
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Plaintiff also relies heavily on three other cases
Labor Life Insurance Company v. Parmley, 270 Md. 146, 311 A.2d 24
(1973), Woolery v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Companv, 406

F.Supp. 641

(E.D.Va., 1976), and Metropolitan Life Insurance

Company v. Spearman, 344 F.Supp. 665

(M.D.Ala., 1972), and claims

that these cases should be binding upon this Court.

These cases

are inapplicable to the questions of law raised in this case in
that the facts are clearly distinguishable.
In each of these cases, the dispute was between individuals,
each of which claimed to be the spouse of the decedent.
not the case here.

That is

In addition, the decedents were never

divorced from their first wives and, in fact, appeared to
maintain some sort of continuing relationship with these prior
spouses.

Again, that is not the case here.

Further, the wives

in those cases had no knowledge of the decedent's ongoing
relationships with the second spouses.
Likewise, such was not the case here and, consequently,
Appellant's reliance on these cases is misplaced.

Simply put,

those Courts were required to decide who, as between a lawful and
an unlawful spouse, was to receive insurance proceeds.

Because

of their particular facts and the nature of the competing
interests in each case, the Trial Courts did not deal with the
contract principals which were before the Trial Court in this
case.

Parenthetically, both Woolery, supra, and Spearman,

dealt with interpretation of terms under the Federal Employees
Group Life Insurance Act of 1954, 5 U.S.C.A. §8701,
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and.

therefore, like the Workman's Compensation cases, revolve around
intPrpretation and application of statutory law.

POINT II
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN WILLIS B. PROCTOR AND RESPONDENT
SHOULD BE EQUITABLY RECOGNIZED AT LEAST FOR THE PURPOSES
OF DISTRIBUTING THE LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN DISPUTE
Under the principles of equity it would be unfair to negate
the clear intent of the decedent as to who was to receive the
insurance proceeds and to disregard the thirteen year
relationship which both decedent and Respondent believed to be
valid.
This Court dealt with a proposition very analogous to the
one at hand in In Re: Williams Estate, 10 Ut.2d 83, 348 P.2d 684

11960).

In this case, the Petitioner brought an action seeking

her determination as an heir in the estate of a husband and wife
who had reared her during her entire childhood.

She produced

circumstantial evidence of a adoption contract between her
natural mother and the Decedent and claimed that the contract had
been fully performed with the exception of the failure to obtain
a legal Decree of Adoption and that equity should require an
award of specific performance of the same.

The Court, in

protecting the interest of the heir, adopted the theory of
"equitable adoption" and stated:
Under the doctrine that the equity regards as done
what should have been done, she contends that as a
means of specific performance, she should be awarded
the same share of the Williamses estate as she would
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have been entitled to had they fully performed their
contract and fulfilled their agreement to adopt.
Al though
we
have
never
decided
this
exact
question, we have required specific performance of
contracts in contemplation of death, where a deceased
person has failed to divide, transfer or convey certain
property in accordance with an agreement for services
which has been fully performed by the other party.
It
is generally recognized that where a child's parents
agree with the adoptive parents to relinquish all their
rights to the child in consideration of the adoptive
parents' agreement to adopt such child, and to care and
for it, the same as though it were their own child, and
such agreement is fully performed by all parties
connected with such contract except that there is no
actual
adoption,
the
Court will
decree
specific
performance of such contract and thereby award the
child the same distributive share of the adoptive
parents' estate as it would have been entitled to had
the child actually been adopted as agreed.
Id. at
684-685.
The rationale of the "equitable adoption" theory seems to carry
over into the family relationship of the case at hand.

Decedent

and Respondent entered into a contract to marry and a contract to
work and provide for the other, including, among other things, an
expectation to receive insurance proceeds in the event of
either's untimely death.

Under the circumstances of this case,

there was at least an "equitable marriage" in existence and,
therefore,

( 1) the parties should be considered man and wife, at

least for insurance purposes, and (2) the insurance contracts
should be construed so as to read Respondent as beneficiary
regardless of her legal marital status.
It would also go against the obvious intent of the Utah
Legislature for any Court to hold that a marital relationship
between the parties, al though void, should be regarded as void
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ab

all purposes.

Section 30-1-17 Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

specifically allows any party to a marriage to seek equitable
relief in cases involving a void marriage.
Action
to
Determine Validity of Marriage
Judgment of Validity of Annulment. - When there is
doubt as to the validity of a marriage, either party
may, in a court of equity in a country where either
party is domiciled, demand its avoidance or affirmance,
. . . Id.
Section 30-1-17. 2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953), additionally provides,

in part:
Actions to Determine Validity of a Marriage - Orders
Relating to Parties, Property and Children - LegitiiiiaC'Y
of Children
If the parties have accumulated any
property or acquired any obligations subsequent to the
marriage, or there is a genuine need arising from
economic change of circumstances due to the marriage,
or if there are children born, or expected, the court
may make temporary and final orders, and subsequently
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their
property and obligations,
the .children and their
custody or visitation, and the support and maintenance
of the parties and children, as may be equitable • • •
Id. (Emphasis added.)
This language clearly acknowledges the very real fact that
parties, who in good faith believe themselves to be married, do
acquire "marital" property and obligations, and the Utah Courts
do have the power to divide such property in an equitable manner.
This Court acknowledged this proposition in Jenkins v.
107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944).

In this case, the

Plaintiff brought an action for divorce against her husband.
uu1ing the trial, the issue was raised as to whether or not the
"1erriage had ever been valid due to the fact that Plaintiff
"'ar ried the Defendant during the Interlocutory Period of a prior
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divorce.

The Court held that the marriage was void ab

but that the Court must equitably treat the distribution of
marital assets acquired in good faith during that marriage and
stated:
. the court clearly had the authority to declare
the purported marriage void.
Where the marriage has
been entered into in good faith by both parties or
where, as here, both parties knew of the Interlocutory
Decree of Divorce, which had not yet become final, the
court in the exercise of its equitable power has
jurisdiction to require equitable distribution of the
property acquired during the time the litigants were
cohabitating as man and wife.
See, Sanguinetti v.
Sanguinetti, 9 Ca.2d 95, 69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342;
Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339; Fuller v.
Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 P. 241; Werner v. Werner, 59
Kan. 399, 53 P. 127, 41 L.R.A. 349, 68 Kan.St.Rep. 372;
Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30, 190 P. 1088; Deem v.
Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656, 43 L.R.A. 207, 96 Am.
St.Rep. 263;
Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P.
1079, 126 Am.St.Rep. 900; Powers v. Powers, 117 Wash.
248, 200 P. 1080. Id. at 263-264.
The Court went on to quote from the Figoni case, supra, and
stated:
Likewise, the power of the court to divide
equally between the parties the property acquired by
their joint efforts while living together under a void
marriage
entered
into
in
good
faith
is
well
established.
(Citations) Id. at 264.
The obvious principle of both the Utah statutes and this
case is that even if a marriage is void ab initio and later
validly annuled, the parties do have some type of ownership
status in the marital property of the relationship.

It is

clearly evident from the facts of this case that the insurance
policies in question were property of this marital relationship,
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and the beneficial proceeds of each policy were properly to be
paid tn the survivor of that relationship.
This position was dealt with specifically by the United
states Court of Appeals, in the case of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922 (2nd Cir., 1977).

In

this case, a woman was married, left her first husband and later
married a second husband without any formal proceedings being
entered into between the initial parties.

Upon the death of the

wife, the first husband brought this action seeking the payment
of the $10,000 life insurance proceeds paid under the wife's
Federal Employee's Group Life Policy.

The wife had failed to

designate a specific beneficiary and, therefore, the proceeds
were payable to her "widower".

The Court stated that Connecticut

law does characterize a bigamous marriage as "in valid".
However, the Court then went on to deal with the issue of whether
or not this good faith relationship of the parties vested in the
second husband some sort of property rights in the life insurance
proceeds.

The Court discussed this case in conjunction with an

earlier Connecticut decision [Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn.
152, 204 A.2d 909

(1964)] and stated:

The Perlstein case, discussed above, in connection
with the Connecticut presumption of validity of a
second marriage, appears to assume that a bigamous
marriage is "invalid".
In addition, as noted above, we
do not read Perlstein as precluding an attack on a
bigamous marriage by a non-party to that marriage even
in the absence of a judicial decree declaring the
marriage void.
Perlstein, however, forcefully rejects
the theory that a bigamous marriage is "an absolute
nulli tv ab ini tio so that nothing in the way of a
status- or-res-ever= flowed from the marriage" . . . and
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the invalidity ab initio following annulment of a
bigamous
marriage was-characterized
as
a
"legal
fiction" to be "applied only as the purposes of justice
require".
While the Connecticut courts do not appear
to have subsequent occasion to elaborate upon this
language, we believe it means at a minimum, under the
circumstances of this
case,
that Manning
(second
husband) would have sufficient status as a "widower" to
entitle him to the insurance proceeds.
For after all,
the insurance was paid for by deductions from Irene's
wages earned after the second marriage, during which
period Irene and Manning consistently held themselves
out as husband and wife, and during which period Gaines
(first husband) had nothing whatsoever to do with
Irene.
Gaines did nothing in reliance on his own
status except to maintain in silence his claim that he
was Irene's lawful spouse.
The "purposes of justice"
therefore under Connecticut law would not require a
complete and retroactive invalidation of the Mannings'
relationship.
We hold, at the very least, for the
purpose of determining Manning's right to the proceeds
of Irene's Federal Employee's Group Life Insurance,
that Manning was the lawful widower.
Id. at 929.
(Descriptions added.)
This Court can, by equity, acknowledge that the marital
relationship that existed between the insured Decedent and the
Respondent for the purpose of distributing the proceeds from the
life insurance of the Deceased only, thereby properly giving
effect to the intent of the insured Decedent.

A reversal

Trial Court's Summary Judgment, as requested by Appellant,
necessarily would result in a disregard of the desires and wishes
of the Decedent and also would ignore long established contract
maxims designated to protect the intent of the contracting
parties.

This Court has often stated that where there is a

choice, "an interpretation which will bring about an equitable
result will be preferred over a harsh or inequitable one",
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Inc. v. Bitters, 28
11972).

Ut.2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010

The Trial Court's Summary Judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Pespondent has demonstrated her right to receive the
proceeds of the insurance policies in question.

The documents on

their faces and the acts of Respondent and the decedent clearly
show that decedent, in contracting with Respondent Insurance
company of North America, intended Respondent Shirley Proctor to
receive, as his spouse, the entire amount of the benefits payable
under the policies upon his death.

The cases and statutes also

clearly show that it was the intent of the Utah legislature and
the interpretation of the Utah Supreme Court, that even though a
marriage may be void ab initio, a status in the property of that
good faith marital relationship does exist and a Court may
equitably divide such property.

Respondent Shirley Worthen

Proctor is entitled to retain the insurance proceeds paid to her
as the spouse of Willis B. Proctor.

The Trial Court's Summary

Judgment should be affirmed.

;;:ft

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 1983.

GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
!

; ../JV..

. ,..1

lfENT M. KASTING
Attorney for Respondent,
Shirley Fletcher aka
Shirley Worthen
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<EN'!' M, KASTING
;11s'l'TN, ADAMS, KAfl'l'Hffi & LIAPIS
\ttorneys for Defendant,
Proctor (Worthen)
uo11 Boston Building
Ex• hanqe Place
,olt Lake City, Utah 84111
elephone: 801/532-6996

ITLLIAM W. DOWNES,
:OLLA RD, KUNHAUSEN, PIXTON & IWASAKI
,ttorneys for Plaintiff
17 church Street
alt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COtn{TY
STATE OF UTAH

----------00000---------UZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf of
er minor daughter, ANGELA BETH
ROCTOR,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMPANY OF NORTH
qERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER
<a SHIRLEY WORTHEN,
Defendants.

STIPULATED FACTS
FILED IN CONNECTION WITH
THE PARTIES' RESPECTIVE
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No.

C 81 987

----------00000---------COMES NOW the above-named parties, by and through their
'spective counsel, and hereby submit the following stipulated
1cts

to the Court in connection with the Motions for Summary

1dqment which have been filed in this matter by Plaintiff and
Shirley Fletcher Proctor.

.t.. ""'*'

STIPULATED FACTS
1.

On or about April 1, 1978, a policy of insurance was

purchased from the Defendant Insurance Company of North America
through the Chevron Travel Club, Inc., insuring one Willis B.
Proctor against the loss of life caused by an accident.

Willis

B. Proctor signed the application form and was designated as the
member and the insured.

A copy of this application form and the

policy of insurance are attached to these Stipulated Facts and
marked Exhibit 1.
2.

This policy of insurance provides that the insured may

designate, in writing, a beneficiary and if no beneficiary is
named the proceeds of said policy of insurance are payable to the
first surviving class of the following classes of beneficiaries:
( 1) wife or husband;

( 2) child or children;

(4) brothers or sisters.

( 3) mother or father;

No specific individual beneficiary was

named by Mr. Proctor in the policy, however, the application had
affixed to it a stamp electing for Plan II, entitled •Member and
Spouse•.
3.

On or about January 1, 1979, a second policy of

insurance was purchased from Defendant Insurance Company of North
America providing for increased benefits in the sum of $25, 000 to
the Insured's surviving beneficiary.

Mr. Proctor was also

designated as the insured on this second policy.

No specific

individual beneficiary was named in that application, however,
the box entitled "Member and Spouse" was checked.

2

Mr. Proctor's

siynaturP appears on the application.
,5

attached to these Stipulated Facts and marked Exhibit 2.
4.

_., 1

A copy of this application

On or about September 18, 1980, Willis B. Proctor

stained multiple injuries when a motorcycle he was riding

collided with an automobile in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
As a result of these injuries, Willis B. Proctor died in Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, on September 29, 1980.
5.

Angela Beth Proctor, a minor, was born to Willis B.

Proctor and Suzanne Proctor, the Plaintiff in this action, on
November 16, 1966.

Angela Beth Proctor is the sole surviving

issue of Willis B. Proctor.
6.

On April 24, 1966, Willis B. Proctor and Suzanne

Proctor were married; this marriage was dissolved by an entry of
an Interlocutory Decree of Divorce in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the same to become final three months after its entry on
March 13, 1968.

In connection with the granting of this divorce,

Willis B. Proctor withdrew his Answer and allowed Suzanne Proctor
to proceed on a default basis to secure a default Decree.

Willis

B Proctor was present in Court when the Answer was withdrawn,

however it is not known if he was present when the Suzanne
Proctor proceeded to give testimony regarding the allegations of
1er Complaint for Divorce.

A copy of the Decree of Divorce is

•tlriched to these Stipulated Facts and marked Exhibit 3.
7.

The proceeds from the policies of insurance described

par<lgraphs 1 and 3 above in the sum of $46,701.50 were paid to

.,

one Shirley Fletcher Proctor by Defendant Insurance Company of

•North

America.

In addition, there is presently an additional

$1, 900 still to be paid from Defendant Insurance Company of North
America to the appropriate beneficiary of the Decedent.

Shirley

Fletcher Proctor claimed to be the wife of the Decedent at the
time of his death.
8.

Shirley Fletcher Proctor participated in a marriage

ceremony with Willis B. Proctor in Las Vegas, Nevada, on July 15,
1967, prior to any Decree of Divorce being entered between Willis
B. Proctor and Suzanne Proctor.

A copy of the marriage

certificate reflecting this ceremony is attached to these
stipulated facts and marked Exhibit 4.
9.

Willis B. Proctor resided in the State of Utah in 1967

and continued to reside in Utah until his death; Shirley Fletcher
Proctor resided together_ in Utah in 1967 and continues to reside
in the State of Utah at the present time.

Willis B. Proctor and

Shirley Fletcher resided in the home of Willis B. Proctor's
parents continuously for four to five years before Decedent's
death.
10.

Willis B. Proctor and Shirley Fletcher Proctor filed

joint income tax returns as husband and wife for the years 1973,
1974, 1975, 1977, 1978 and 1979.

Willis B. Proctor filed a

separate income tax return for the year 1976.

Copies of these

income tax returns have been attached to these Stipulated Facts
and have been collectively marked Exhibit 5.
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Jl.

During the period of time Willis B. Proctor and Shirley

, Jelcher Proctor resided together, Willis B. Proctor signed
documents indicating Shirley Fletcher Proctor to be his

, 31 1nus

wife
from

Attached to these Stipulated Facts is a loan application
consolidated Freightways Credit Union designating Willis B.

Proctor as being married and bearing his signature and an
anniversary card from the Decedent sent to Shirley Fletcher
Proctor in July of 1980 and collectively marked Exhibit 6.
12.

All of the signatures contained on the Exhibits

attached to these Stipulated Facts are the signatures of
Willis B. Proctor.

DATED this ...J:2__ day of February, 1983.

WILLIAM W. DOWNES
Attorney for Plaintiff

/I);;

0/;i -

R.
Attorney for Insurance Company
of North America
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf
of her minor daughter,
ANGELA BETH PROCTOR,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. C-81-987

vs.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
A."1ERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER,
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN,
Defendants.
The reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment filed on behalf
of the plaintiff against the defendants, and filed on behalf of
the defendants against the plaintiff came before the Court on a
stipulated set of facts.

The natter was argued at length to the

Court wherein counsel for the respective parties set forth their
respective positions, connnented on the stipulated set of facts,
and offered argument to the Court as to the manner in which the
stipulated set of facts should be legally interpreted as to their
respective positions.

The Court took the matter under advisement

to consider the Memoranda filed by the respective parties, the
Depositions of Shirley Proctor, and the other pleadings and
documents on file herein.

The Court has now carefully reviewed

PROCTOR

VS. INSURANCE

<.UMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,

ET AL
; 11

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

e fulegoing material, and otherwise being fully advised, enters

,he

following Memorandum Decision.
The Court notes that the policy of insurance which governs

the claims and defenses in this matter does not specifically
require under the portion "payment of claims" that the insured' s
"wife" be the legal wife of the insured.

The facts clearly

demonstrate that the defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was not
the legal wife of the deceased Willis B. Proctor.

This Court

is of the opinion, however, that whether or not the defendant
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) was the legal wife or merely held out
to be the wife of the

Willis B. Proctor is not the

principle issue for this Court to decide, but rather the issue
is whether or not it was the intent of Willis B. Proctor that
Shirley Worthen (Proctor) ·would be the beneficiary under the
policies before the Court.

It is this Court's opinion that the

stipulated set of facts and the documents attached thereto clearly
show that while Willis B. Proctor and Shirley Worthen (Proctor)
were not legally married, they held each other out as husband
and wife. thus satisfying the definition of "wife" in the
insurance policy for purposes of establishing a beneficiary
under the policy of insurance upon the death of Willis B. Proctor.

'"" stipulated set of facts and accompanying documents convince

PROCTOR VS. INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
ET AL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

this Court that both law and equity require that the intent of
the deceased and insured under the policy, Willis B. Proctor,
be enforced, and that the evidence preponderates in favor of the
proposition that it was the clear intent of Willis B. Proctor,
deceased/insured, that Shirley Worthen (Proctor) be the
beneficiary under the policies of insurance in question.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court grants the defendant
Shirley Worthen's Motion for Summary Judgment, and denies the
Motion for Stmnnary Judgment of plaintiff Susan Proctor on behalf
of Angela Beth Proctor.
Counsel for defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) is requested
to prepare an appropriate Order and Summary Judgment in
accordance with this Memorandum Decision, setting forth this
Court's opinion that the ·defendant Shirley Worthen (Proctor) is
entitled to Judgment on the plaintiff's Complaint.

The Order

should further reflect that co-defendant Insurance Company of
North America is relieved of any responsibility to the plaintiff
inasmuch as the Court has granted co-defendant Shirley Worthen's
(Proctor) Motion for Summary Judgment.

The proposed Order grantir.:

Judgment and Judgment should be submitted in accordance with Rule

2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the Distr· t Courts for the
State of Utah.
Dated this

day of April,

DISTRt C

H. DIXON HINOL5

Sy

ORtJCTOR vs. INSURANCE
;1MFANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
ri AL
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of

ch<: foregoing Memorandum Dec is ion, pas tage prepaid,

following,

this

...25'"'

day of April, 1983:

William W. Downes, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
1.17 Church Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kent M. Kasting
Attorney for Defendant Fletcher
1000 Bos ton Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R James Clegg
Attorney for Defendant Insurance
Company of North America
Ten Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to the

Ii

EXHIBIT
1 L-•V•

I

C.c.--'

3'

j

FILEr IN "LERK'S O

S;,11

I ·1:
FFICE
-·• ... County. Utah

KENT M. KASTING
,GUSTIN, ADAMS, KAS'i1ING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Defendant,
Shirley Proctor (Worthen)
1000 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
801/532-6996
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

----------00000---------SUZANNE PROCTOR, on behalf of
her minor daughter, ANGELA BETH
PROCTOR,
Plaintiff,

SUMMARY ,JUDGMENT

v.
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA and SHIRLEY FLETCHER
aka SHIRLEY WORTHEN,
Defendants.

Civil No.

C 81 987

The parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment based
upon Stipulated Facts having been argued to the Court on the
23rd day of February, 1983, and Plaintiff being represented by
counsel, William W. Downes, Esq., and Defendant, Shirley Fletcher
aka Shirley Worthen, being represented by counsel, Kent M.
Kasting, Esq., and the Defendant, Insurance Company of North
America, being represented by counsel, H. James Clegg, Esq., and
the parties having agreed and represented to the Court that the
issues raised by the parties'

respective pleadings in this miltter

could be res9lve'!_<!_n_9 decided by the Court based upon a set of
stipulated Facts together with certain attached documents, the
•"thenticity of which was agreed to by all parties and filed with
the Court and the parties having agreed that there were no
other material and operative facts relevant to this matter and
having further agreed that thecase was ripe for disposition by
sumroary Judgment and a Motion for the publication of the
Deposition of Defendant Shirley Proctor having been made and
granted and the Court having reviewed the Deposition, the
Stipulated Facts and Exhibits and the legal memoranda and having
heard argument from counsel and after reviewing all of the
foregoing and the Court having issued and filed its Memorandum
Decision and the Court being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as against

Defendant Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley Worthen and Defendant
Insurance Company of North America is denied.
2.

Defendant, Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley Worthen's,

Motion for Summary Judgment for dismissal of Plaintiff's
Complaint, with prejudice, as against her and Defendant Insurance
Company of North America is hereby granted.
3.

Plaintiff's Complaint, as the same pertains to

PL11ntiff's claims against Defendant Insurance Company of North
'lmr'r l<'a,

is hereby dismissed, with prejudice, and this Defendant

""urance Company of North America is relieved of any

responsibility to the Plaintiff as alleged in Plaintiff's

•
Complaint.
4.

Defendant, Insurance Company of North America's,

Crossclaim against Defendant Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley
Worthen, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
5.

Defendants are awarded their costs of Court incurred in

connection with this

-f1i-

DATED this

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

ay

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
Dep,fyC
foregoing Summarv Ju<lgment was placed with "The Runner Service"
·
for delivery to William
Downes, Jr., Esq., 417 Church Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and to H. James Clegg, Esq., 1100
Newhouse .Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
of

w.

<;<4=<

'

1983.

-

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent Shirley Fletcher aka Shirley
p 10 ctor

was placed with "The Runner Service" for delivery to

William W. Downes, Jr., Esq., Attorney for Appellant, at 417
Church Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, and to H. James

Clegg, Esq., Attorney for Respondent, Insurance Company of North
America, at 1100 Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake
City, Utah

